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Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests synthetic stock prices are lower than actual prices due to short-sale
constraints and voting premiums. This study finds that such underpricing of the synthetic mid
quote disappears if arbitrageurs face security borrowing costs. The synthetic spread predominantly
contains the actual spread. Synthetic stock overpricing is as common as underpricing but the
former is more persistent and more profitable. The difference between synthetic and actual quotes
is significantly affected by options market makers’ hedging costs and investors’ demand for leverage.
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1. Introduction
A synthetic stock created using options should have the same price as the actual stock according
to the law of one price. This result is known as the put-call parity for European options as in
Stoll (1969) and extended by Merton (1973) for American options. A long list of studies examine
whether the put-call parity holds in reality.1 Several recent studies suggest that synthetic stocks
are underpriced due to short-sale constraints on the underlying stocks (Ofek, Richardson, and
Whitelaw, 2004) and value of voting (Kalay, Karakas, and Pant, 2014).
In this study, I use aftermarket data from Option Metrics, CRSP, and Markit between 2007 and
2012 to construct synthetic bid and ask prices for common stocks in the US. Similar to Ofek et al.
(2004), Battalio and Shultz (2006), Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013), and many others,
I adjust for options early exercise premiums and expected dividends based on the put-call parity.
Trading synthetic stocks does not require investors to participate in the security lending market.
However, this may not be the case for investors in the cash market. For example, a short seller in
the stock market needs to borrow shares and pay a fee to the lender. Likewise, a stock owner can
potentially lend the shares out to earn the fee. These security borrowing/lending fees can affect the
net costs of trading actual stocks and potentially distort the put-call parity. To explicitly account for
this friction arising from transaction costs, I assume the marginal investor is an arbitrageur in the
main analysis. I then calculate the cash bid price by deducting the security borrowing fee from the
1Gould and Galai (1974) find frequent deviation from the parity in the over-the-counter market between 1967
and 1969. Klemkosky and Resnick (1979) adjust for dividends in empirical tests of the parity and find the arbitrage
opportunities and profits decrease. Klemkosky and Resnick (1980) find that trading costs and delay in implementation
for arbitragers further excludes violation of the parity. Phillips and Smith (1980) attribute many seemingly arbitrage
opportunities to transaction costs of the bid-ask spread. Kamara and Miller (1995) find the violation is less frequent
for European style index options.
1
observed national best bid price because the arbitrageur needs to borrow stocks to sell. When the
arbitrageur trades at the ask and purchases the stock, I deduct only a probability-adjusted lending
fee because stock owners may not always earn an income from lending the shares they have, as
noted by Atmaz and Basak (2019).2
The comparison between synthetic and cash prices yields the following results. First of all,
underpricing of synthetic stocks disappears once security borrowing costs are included in the
analysis. During my sample period, the synthetic mid quote is slightly lower than the actual
mid quote with an average price ratio of 99.98%. The indicated underpricing of 2 basis points
is already remarkably smaller in this recent sample period when both markets close at the same
time. Moreover, after adjusting security borrowing costs in cash quotes, the synthetic mid quote is
exactly the same as the cash mid quote on average. Therefore, the evidence contradicts systematic
underpricing of synthetic stocks in prior literature.
Secondly, I find that the synthetic ask is higher than the cash ask with a price premium at about
1% on average. However, the synthetic bid is lower than the cash bid with a price discount of
the same magnitude. Although there is no systematic difference between mid quotes on the two
markets, synthetic spreads on average are wider than actual spreads. In fact, more than 95% of
the time, the actual bid and ask prices are contained by the synthetic quote prices. This evidence
suggests that investors almost always face inferior prices in the synthetic market regardless of the
direction of trading. Moreover, this pattern of quotes on the two markets is the most persistent
among all possible quote patterns as the estimated Markov chain suggests. Collectively, the results
2Alternative assumptions regarding the probability of paying/earning the security borrowing fees yield qualitatively
the same results.
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suggest that the difference between synthetic and actual stock prices does not reside in the mid
quote but rather the size of bid-ask spreads.
Thirdly, the total cross-market arbitrage opportunities after accounting for transaction costs
occur in less than 2% of the stock-day observations. More importantly, the likelihood of an
arbitrage opportunity due to synthetic underpricing is almost the same as the likelihood of the
opposite type of arbitrage due to synthetic overpricing. However, arbitrage opportunities due to
overpriced synthetic stocks are more persistent and exhibiting higher arbitrage profits.
The comparison result in this study clearly refutes systematic underpricing of synthetic stocks.
However, why are synthetic prices always worse than cash prices? One possibility is that investors
rarely trade synthetic stocks and wider spreads of synthetic stocks just reflect additive effects
of trading costs of two option trades. However, there is evidence that synthetic stock trading is
commonly used by options traders despite obvious disadvantages in the spread. For example, in
monthly retail investors’ position data in the U.S. studied by Odean (1998), about 6% of options
traders had synthetic stock positions between 1991 and 1996. In Korea’s KOSPI 200 options
market between 2010 and 2014 studied by Hu, Kirilova, Park, and Ryu (2020), synthetic stocks
are used by 37% of domestic institution accounts, 10% of domestic retail accounts, and 31%
of foreign institution accounts. In the second part of the paper, I borrow several theories in the
literature to investigate determinants of synthetic stock spread.
The first mechanism considered is options market makers’ hedging costs. Because delta hedging
in the underlying market is costly, options market makers may transfer the hedging costs to options
traders by quoting wider spreads. Therefore, the synthetic bid and ask also become wider as
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the hedging costs, measured by the underlying bid-ask spread, increases. Moreover, because
hedging may be imperfect, options market makers may quote a risk premium in synthetic prices
for unhedgable risk measured by volatility of implied volatility.
The second determinant of price discrepancy examined in this study is investors’ preference for
leverage. Galeanau and Pedersen (2011) show that margin difference can distort prices of securities
with the same future payoff in credit markets.3 Similarly, the leverage preference could potentially
affect the price of an asset providing higher leverage to equity investors. The capital requirement
to trade synthetic stocks is usually less than a quarter of what is needed to trade underlying stocks
based on the margin requirements posted by equity options exchanges in the US. If it is less capital
demanding to trade synthetic stocks, it is possible that buyers are willing to pay a premium for
synthetic stocks and sellers are willing to accept a discount. Because institutional investors are less
financially constrained, I measure the (inverse) demand for leverage using the proportion of shares
held by institutions.
The last channel is concentrated informed trading and higher adverse selection costs in the
options market. As Black (1975) note, informed traders can prefer the options market for higher
leverage or to get around short-sale constraints. Supporting evidence exists in e.g. Pan and
Poteshman (2006), Hu (2014), and Ge, Lin, Pearson (2016). Higher information risk in options
trading can lead to wider spreads as options market makers adjust for adverse selection costs in
the quotes. In the empirical analysis, adverse selection costs are proxied by the absolute order
3See theoretical analysis of interaction between leverage and asset prices in, e.g. Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2018),
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2003), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), and Rytchkov
(2014). Empirical evidence of such pricing effect can be found in, e.g., Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Jiang (2018)
for the cross-section of equity, Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) for the credit market, Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) for
hedge fund strategies on corporate securities, Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) for hedge fund returns, and Boguth and
Smutin (2018) for mutual fund returns.
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imbalance in the two markets following an approximation to the probability of informed trading
derived by Easley, Engle, O’Hara, and Wu (2008).
To examine determinants of the price difference between synthetic and actual stocks, I construct
relative ask and bid by dividing the synthetic ask and bid using the cash ask and bid. Then I
separately regress relative ask and bid on the aforementioned explanatory variables using Fama-MacBeth
(1973) regressions. The results clearly support the first two channels. Specifically, consistent with
higher hedging costs leading to wider synthetic spreads, both underlying spread and volatility of
implied volatility increase synthetic ask relative to actual ask but decrease synthetic bid relative to
actual bid. Also consistent with investors’ preference of leverage driving asset prices, institutional
ownership is negatively associated with the relative ask and positively with the relative bid, suggesting
that capital constraint of the representative investor can make synthetic stocks more attractive,
resulting in seemingly inferior synthetic prices. The results are less clear regarding the information
story. The absolute stock order imbalance significantly reduces the relative spread by making the
relative ask lower and relative bid higher, consistent with higher information risk in stock trading
resulting in wider stock spreads. However, the absolute options order imbalance does not have
a robust relation with the relative ask or bid. In the tests when the relations are statistically
significant, information risk in options trading also narrows the spread gap rather than widens
the gap. Therefore, these tests fail in providing conclusive evidence regarding the role of adverse
selection costs in synthetic stock pricing.
The paper contributes to the finance literature in several ways. First, I show that the synthetic
mid quote is not systematically lower than the actual mid quote. This result contrasts conclusions
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in prior studies such as Ofek et al. (2004) and Kalay, et al. (2014). I find that the previous results
are largely driven by asynchronous trading in the past and imperfection in adjusting for security
borrowing costs when researchers compare stock prices in the two markets.
Second, I find that synthetic quotes differ from actual quotes mainly in the size of the spread
rather than the midpoint location. Synthetic stocks usually have wider spreads and it is more costly
to trade synthetic stocks for price takers. This result exists in the large cross-section of all stocks
with options and is consistent with intraday findings from restricted samples by Battlio and Schultz
(2006) and Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013). Moreover, I also examine the determinants
of such quote differences and uncover significant effects from both the supply (hedging costs) and
demand sides (leverage). Therefore, seemingly inferior synthetic pricing can be an equilibrium
outcome. These results are novel to the literature and relate to the growing literature on pricing
liquidity and leverage. In a recent study, Goncalves-Pinto et al. (2020) find that options quotes lag
stock quotes in response to price pressures, leading to significant return predictability from options
prices when subsequent stock price reversal happens. The results in this study provide potential
reasons to such stickiness in options prices because the price difference across the two markets
does not often induce arbitrage opportunities.
Finally, I propose an augmented put-call parity adjusting for security borrowing costs. This
is one of the first papers noting the importance of security lending fees in derivative pricing.
Muravyev, Pearson, and Pollet (2018) find that the option-implied borrowing cost is close to the
actual borrowing cost. Atmaz and Basak (2019) extend the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing
framework using security borrowing costs and analyze option prices during the short-selling ban
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in 2008. This study differs from the aforementioned work by testing the augmented put-call parity
instead of analyzing model-dependent option prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, sample selection,
and explains how main variables are constructed. Section 3 reports the empirical results of the
analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data
2.1. Sample selection
I obtain daily close bid and ask prices of options and underlying stocks from Option Metrics and
CRSP, respectively. I acquire the security lending fee from Markit for common stocks in the US
between 2007 and 2012, as well as the total loanable shares and outstanding shares on loan. To be
included in the sample, each stock-day observation must have non-missing close bid-ask prices in
both CRSP and Option Metrics, and have borrowing cost information in Markit. The study focuses
on common stocks with CRSP security code of 10 and 11. After merging the databases, there are
3,309,575 daily observations. To avoid impact of penny stocks, 391,752 observations with the
underlying stock price below 5 dollars are excluded. Also excluded are 12,609 observations with
stock distributions other than ordinary dividend because options trading around these corporate
events can differ from normal days. Other than deleting data errors such as loanable shares greater
than 100%, following Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004), I also exclude observations with
negative security lending fees. This treatment further removes 125 observations. I use only the
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closest-to-the-money pair of call and put options with the strike price to spot price ratio between
0.95 and 1.05, non-zero open interest, and the maturity of 10 to 40 days because such options have
the best liquidity and smallest early exercise premiums, and are less affected by non-normalities of
the asset price dynamics.4 There are 2,087,891 observations left after this procedure. To avoid bad
quotes, I exclude any locked (bid = ask) or crossed (bid > ask) quotes of the underlying stock, call
and put options, and require the bid price to be non-zero, leaving 1,934,827 observations. Finally,
to mitigate the impact of outliers, I exclude 20,026 observations that have the ask greater than 10
times the bid price and the bid-ask spread greater than one dollar on either the call or put option.
The final sample contains 1,914,801 stock-day observations. Table 1 describes this sample. The
number of observations and unique number of stocks are relatively stable over individual years
with around 2300 unique stocks and 3 million stock-day observations every year. Table 1 also lists
the average daily stock and options trading volumes and the options open interest. It is clear that
options market liquidity has significantly improved over time with growing average daily trading
volume while the average stock trading volume peaks in the financial crisis in 2008 and then
gradually decreases afterwards.
(Table 1 about here)
4Using alternative options contracts also yields qualitatively the same results although there are slightly more
occasions when the no-arbitrage bounds are violated.
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2.2. Synthetic stock prices
Following Battalio and Schultz (2006) and Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013), I calculate
the synthetic stock bid (bidi) and ask (aski) prices as follows:
aski = (Ask Call−EEP Call)− (Bid Put−EEP Put)+PV (K)+PV (Div), (1)
bidi = (Bid Call−EEP Call)− (Ask Put−EEP Put)+PV (K)+PV (Div), (2)
where Ask Call and Bid Call are the ask and bid prices of the call option, Ask Put and Bid Put are
the ask and bid prices of the put option, EEP Call and EEP Put are the early exercise premiums of
call and put options, PV (K) and PV (Div) are the present values of the strike price and the expected
dividend. The early exercise premium is calculated as the difference between the actual price
and the Black-Scholes model implied European option price using implied volatilities in Option
Metrics. The expected dividend is the announced future dividend before the options expiration.
2.3. Adjusting borrowing costs in actual stock prices
A price taker pays the ask price to buy stocks. This long stock position can be liquidated at any
time. However, the synthetic stock will expire when the options expire. Without loss of generality,
the analysis assumes the long position will be held until the options maturity when comparing
synthetic and actual ask prices. During this investment period, the investor may lend the stock to
earn extra income. Stock lending is typically done through brokers in an over-the-counter market.5
5See D’Avolio (2002) for more details about this market.
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Suppose that the borrowers of stocks pay a net lending fee (lending f ee) to the lender and the
probability of lending is the same as the ratio of outstanding shares on loan to the total loanable
shares (utilization), the net purchase cost for the actual stock is the following:
aska = ask ∗ (1−utilization∗ lending f ee∗ t ∗ exp(−r ∗ t)), (3)
where ask is the original national best close ask price across all stock exchanges, r is the risk-free
rate, and t is the time to expiration of the options used to construct the synthetic stock. In order to
streamline the analysis on the net cost of security borrowing, I do not consider uncertainty from
early recall of the shares on loan by the lender.
The bid price adjustment is more complicated depending on the seller’s stock position. If
the seller already has a long stock position (a stock owner), after selling the stock, the seller
forgoes the expected actual income from lending the stock. If the seller does not have a stock
position (an arbitrager), the total security lending cost must be deducted from the sales proceeds
when calculating actual prices. Therefore, the borrowing-cost adjusted bid price is different for
stock owners and arbitragers. Because cross-market price efficiency depends critically on arbitrage
activities, this study focuses on the bid price for arbitragers defined as:
bida = bid ∗ (1− lending f ee∗ t ′ ∗ exp(−r ∗ t)), (4)
where bid is the original national best close bid price across all exchanges, t ′ is the time between
settlement of short sale and options maturity date, and the other variables are the same as defined
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previously.6 The settlement date of short sale is used instead of the execution date because
practically the short seller needs to deliver the stock only on the settlement day. This time lag
between execution and settlement in the security lending market is usually 3 days. This choice of
settlement lag, however, is not critical to the analysis as the results are largely the same without
having the settlement lag.
3. Compare the synthetic and actual prices
To begin the analysis, I first compare the midpoint of bid and ask prices between synthetic and
actual stocks in Table 2 similar to existing studies. Panel A shows that the ratio of synthetic
mid quote and raw cash mid quote has an average of 99.975% with a standard deviation of
0.473%. The 2.5 basis points (bp) of price discount on the synthetic mid quote is smaller than
the discount of about 20 bp in Ofek et al. (2004). This reduction of underpricing can result
from synchronous trading of the two markets during my sample period as well as development in
financial markets over time. In the extreme, the synthetic mid quote can be only about 75% of the
actual mid quote or exceed 150% of the actual mid quote. After adjusting for borrowing costs, the
ratio between synthetic mid quote and cash mid quote averages at 100.001%, indicating that the
synthetic underpricing disappears completely in the price ratio. Panel A also reports descriptive
statistics for the dollar difference and the effects of borrowing costs clearly exist here too. Without
borrowing costs, the synthetic mid quote is lower than the actual quote by 66 cents on average.
The price wedge reduces to less than 5 cents once the borrowing costs are considered.
6Using the bid price for stock owners generates largely the same conclusion in the analysis.
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Panel B reports the percentage of observations having the synthetic midpoint above and below
the actual midpoint in individual years as well as in the full sample. Without considering borrowing
costs, the synthetic midpoint is above the actual midpoint for 44.75% of all stock-day observations
in the sample. In other words, the synthetic mid quote is more likely to be lower than the actual
mid quote with a frequency difference of 10.5%. Once the security borrowing costs are included in
the analysis, however, the proportion of observations with higher synthetic mid quote increases to
47.83%, significantly reducing the imbalance between the two types of observations from 10.5%
to 4.34%. The same pattern is present for all individual years except 2008, when significantly more
observations have synthetic prices below the actual price. The anomaly in 2008 are consistent with
previous findings for stocks under the SEC’s short-selling ban in Battalio and Schultz (2011) and
Grundy, Lim, and Verwijmeren (2012). However, I find that the effect is market-wide rather than
confined to only stocks under the short-selling ban.
(Table 2 about here)
The results in Table 2 indicate that synthetic stocks have similar values to actual stocks at
the mid quote prices. But most options traders are liquidity takers. Therefore, it is important to
examine the bid and ask prices separately in addition to the mid quote. Table 3 examines the
relative bid price similar to Table 2. Panel A shows that on average, the synthetic bid price is lower
than the actual bid for an arbitrager with a discount of about one percent. The dollar difference on
average is about 26 cents per share, equivalent to about one percent of the actual bid price. The
extreme bid difference can exceed 30 dollars in both directions. The effect of borrowing cost is
much smaller in this analysis of the relative bid than in the case of mid quote. Panel B of Table 3
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shows that during the full sample period, 97.9% of the stock-day observations have the synthetic
bid less than the actual bid even after adjusting for borrowing costs. This ratio is stable around
98% in individual years, and increases slightly if borrowing costs are not accounted for. During
volatile periods in 2008 and 2009, there are more observations with the synthetic bid below the
actual bid. Clearly, the bid price is lower in the synthetic market than the actual market.
(Table 3 about here)
Next I turn to the ask side in Table 4. Panel A shows that the average synthetic ask price is
greater than the average actual ask price with a premium of about 1%. Even for unadjusted actual
ask, the synthetic ask is about 25.1 cents higher on average. Including borrowing costs does not
significantly change the result. The synthetic ask premium in this table is similar in magnitude to
the synthetic bid discount in Table 3. Given that no penny stock is included in the sample, the large
premium of the synthetic ask is surprising. In Panel B, I find that between 2007 and 2012, 97.67%
of stock-day observations have the synthetic ask above the adjusted actual ask. Even without
borrowing costs, 97.09% of observations still have higher synthetic ask prices. Similar pattern also
exists in individual years. Surprisingly, in 2008 and 2009, the ratio does not decrease while more
synthetic bids fall below the actual bid at the same time. Instead, the ratio rises above 98%. This
increase cannot be explained by the short-selling ban or elevated short-selling difficulty during the
financial crisis, suggesting room for other determinants of the price difference.
(Table 4 about here)
The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that price takers usually have better prices in the actual
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market than in the options market regardless of the direction of trades. I will further investigate
why the synthetic prices can remain inferior in an equilibrium later.
4. Arbitrage opportunities
In this section, I examine potential cross-market arbitrage opportunities. Given two sets of bid and
ask prices and no data error of crossed or locked spread in the same market, there are six possible
scenarios as illustrated in Figure 1.
• Type A: Synthetic ask above actual ask, and synthetic bid below actual bid.
• Type B: Synthetic ask above actual ask, and synthetic bid between actual ask and actual bid.
• Type C: Synthetic ask between actual ask and actual bid, and synthetic bid below actual bid.
• Type D: Synthetic ask below actual ask, and synthetic bid above actual bid.
• Type E: Synthetic bid above actual ask.
• Type F: Synthetic ask below actual bid.
(Figure 1 about here)
Out of the six types, only Type E and Type F represent arbitrage opportunities. Type E arbitrage
involves selling at the synthetic bid and buying at the actual ask when the synthetic stock is
overpriced relative to the actual stock. Type F arbitrage is the opposite. Panel A of Table 5
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reports the frequency of each type of quote location using borrowing-adjusted actual prices in
individual years as well as the full sample. Type A quotes clearly dominate the sample with
95.66% of observations in this category in the full sample. There is a marginal decrease in this
ratio in the second half of the sample. Nonetheless, most of the time, the synthetic bid and ask
prices contain the actual bid and ask. The next two types, B and C, have one spread partially
entering the other but do not represent executable arbitrage opportunities. Each of these two types
account for less than 1.5% of the observations. The least frequent type is Type D, which has the
synthetic quote contained by the actual quote. There is only 0.1% of observations in this category
and there is a clear declining trend over time. Finally, the Type E arbitrage opportunity occurs
in 0.89% of observations and the Type F arbitrage in 0.82% of observations. There is no clear
imbalance between the frequencies of these two types of arbitrage. Interestingly, both Type E
and F arbitrage opportunities see some growth over time. To reconcile the finding with results in
previous studies, Panel B uses the original actual bid and ask prices without security borrowing
costs. Now the ratio of Type F arbitrage increases to 1.28% in the full sample and the ratio of
Type E arbitrage decreases to 0.75%. But once the borrowing cost is included, this asymmetry
disappears. Nonetheless, even without borrowing cost, Type A quotes exist for 95.5% of total
observations, clearly representing an equilibrium result that is not well studied in the literature.
These results suggest that cross-market arbitrage opportunities occur in less than 2% of stock-days
in these markets, and most of the time, the synthetic quotes contain the actual quotes on both the
ask and bid sides.
(Table 5 about here)
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Table 6 reports the one-day Markov chain transition matrix estimated in the full sample. Regardless
of the quote type on the previous day, the most likely state for the current quotes is always Type A
as the estimated Type A probabilities in the first column are always the largest in each row. If the
quote type is Type A, the same type occurs on the next day with a probability of 97.22%. For other
quote types, they will become Type A with probabilities greater than 40% on the following day.
The next largest probability in each row is then the same type as the previous day. However, for
the no-arbitrage types B, C, and D, the tendency of remaining the same type is less than 13% and
they switch to Type A with probabilities of at least 68%. The Type F arbitrage with underpriced
synthetic stocks has a probability of 19.56% to remain as the same arbitrage type on the following
day. But the Type E arbitrage with overpriced synthetic stocks is even more persistent with a
probability of 37.98% to be the same type on the following day.
(Table 6 about here)
To understand how profitable the two types of arbitrage opportunities are, Panel A (B) of
Table 7 reports the number of stock-days with Type E (F) arbitrage opportunities and average
arbitrage profit per share. Looking at Type E first, Columns (1) and (2) show that there are 17,007
observations flagged in the full sample with an average arbitrage profit of 29.9 cents per share.
There is a clear pattern of increasing number of arbitrage opportunities (possibly due to expansion
of the options market) and decreasing average profits over time. To assess whether the arbitrage
profit survives transaction costs, I assume an arbitrager pays commissions for 10 lots of trades
in Columns (3) and (4) and for 1 lot only in Columns (5) and (6).7 The commission per share
7I follow Barraclough and Whaley (2012) to use the concurrent broker quote for electronic trading by Charles
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is reduced when the trading volume increases because of dilution in fixed cost. The number of
arbitrage opportunities decreases after transaction costs are included. However, even with the
highest transaction costs for only 1 lot of trade, there are still 2,784 observations under Type E
arbitrage. Moreover, the average profit increases to 0.621 and 1.297 dollars per share when the
commissions of 10 lots and 1 lot are considered, respectively. Turning to Type F arbitrage next,
Panel B shows that there are 15,677 observations in this category with an average arbitrage profit of
4.9 cents per share. While the frequency of Type F is similar to that of Type E, the average profit is
much lower. After transaction costs are included in the analysis, Type F arbitrage opportunities also
become less frequent. With fees for 1 lot of trade, there are only 433 Type F arbitrage opportunities
with an average profit of 0.411 dollar per share. The result suggests that arbitrage opportunities
due to underpriced synthetics are more difficult to capture than those due to overpriced synthetics.
(Table 7 about here)
5. Determinants of relative prices
So far, the analysis has shown that the synthetic stock quote contains the actual quote most of the
time and there are limited arbitrage opportunities across the two markets. A natural question is
why the synthetic quotes are worse than actual quotes while the midpoints are the same. In the rest
of the paper, I explore the following mechanisms as potential determinants of the relative prices.
Schwab to estimate the options and stock trading and options exercise costs. Specifically, the trading commission is
8.95 dollars for one stock trade regardless of the size of the trade, 8.95 dollars plus 75 cents per lot for an option trade,
and 8.95 dollars for an order to exercise options. Under this fee structure, the total commission paid to trade 10 lots of
shares involves one stock transaction, two options transactions, and one options exercise, amounting to 41.9 dollars,
equivalent to a per share cost of 4.19 cents. To trade one lot of shares, the per-share cost is significantly higher at 28.35
cents because there is a large portion of fixed cost in the broker fee.
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1. Hedging costs: From the market makers’ viewpoint, the synthetic security can be more
costly to quote because of the required delta hedging and imperfect hedge (Cetin, et al.,
2006, Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman, 2009, and Goyenko, Ornthanalai, and Tang,
2015). Therefore, market makers have an incentive to quote higher synthetic ask and lower
synthetic bid than the actual prices. Three measures of hedging costs are used. The first is
the underlying stock’s percentage bid-ask spread (Spread) as the options market makers are
likely to pay the stock spread when performing delta hedging. The second measure is stock
return volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns in the past 21 trading
days, which correlates with the “pick-up” risk of market-making in Muravyev and Pearson
(2020). The last measure is the standard deviation of average implied volatility (Vol ivol)
of at-the-money call and put options with 30 days to maturity in the past 21 business days
using data from OptionMetrics. This volatility of implied volatility measures the remaining
risk after delta hedging coming from either stochastic volatility or jumps.
2. Leverage: Capital constrained investors may prefer securities that provide higher leverage
even if the cash flows are the same (Garleanu and Pedersen, 2011). During the sample
period, trading synthetic stocks requires an investor to pay the full premium for the long
leg of option and deposit into a margin account for the short leg. The total sales proceed
of the short leg of option is also kept in the margin account before the position is closed.8
Following the required margin rule, we calculate the actual capital needed to trade one share
of a synthetic stock. On average, this number is about 24% of the actual price regardless of
8Details about the options trading margin can be found on options exchanges’ website, e.g. at CBOE
http://www.cboe.com/institutional/margin-and-escrow-receipts.
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the direction of the trade.9 Under Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board, an investor
can borrow up to 50% of the capital needed to trade actual stocks. Therefore, even after
taking the maximum leverage on the actual stock, the synthetic stock still takes less than
half the capital to trade. This difference in capital requirement implies that investors with
capital constraints can achieve larger risk exposure in the synthetic market, making such
securities more attractive. Therefore, it could lead to a price premium for buyers and a
discount for sellers. This leverage-based explanation yields a testable hypothesis both in
time series and in the cross-section. A direct measure of the leverage effect is to compare
the capital requirement to trade synthetic and cash stocks. However, this measure can be
mechanically correlated with the price ratio examined as the dependent variable because the
margin requirement of synthetic stocks is derived using stock and option prices. There can
also be concern that the price difference reverse causes the relative leverage. To circumvent
the issue, I consider a proxy for capital constraint of the representative investor using institutional
ownership (Ownership) at the end of the previous quarter in Thomson Reuters 13F database.
The representative investor is more likely to be financially constrained for stocks with low
institutional holding because retail investors usually have limited financing sources.
3. Adverse selection costs: The risk of trading with an informed investor can increase the
bid-ask spread in market microstructure theories such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and
Easley and O’Hara (1987). If the information risk differs in the two related markets, the
one preferred by informed traders may see wider spreads. A long list of studies examine
the lead-lag relation between the options and stock markets and there is clear evidence of
9Note that for short sellers of the actual stock, a deposit is also collected together with the sales proceed in a margin
account.
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informed trading in both markets (see, e.g. Easley, Srinivas, and O’Hara (1998) and Hu
(2014)). If the options market has a higher concentration of informed traders, it is possible
that the synthetic quote is wider. A recent study of Hu (2018) shows that the introduction of
options leads to more intense trading by informed traders. To measure adverse selection in
both markets, I use the absolute order imbalance as an approximation to the probability of
informed trading following Easley et al. (2008). I follow Hu (2014) to calculate the options
order imbalance as
OOI =
∑nj=1 Dir j ·delta j · size j
Num shares outstanding
, (5)
where the numerate sums the imbalance of options delta volume across all options contracts
on the same underlying stock. The pure stock market order imbalance is then
SOI = TOI−OOI = ∑
N
j=1 Dir j · size j
Num shares outstanding
−OOI, (6)
where TOI is the total stock order imbalance calculated as the net stock imbalance over the
shares outstanding. The options tick data are obtained from Trade Alert LLC and the stock
tick data from NYSE TAQ. Both options and stock trades are signed by the Lee and Ready
(1991) algorithm. In particular, if a transaction is executed above (below) the prevailing
quote midpoint, it is classified as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). For those transacted at the
mid quote, it is buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if the trade price is higher (lower) than the
last different trade price.
To examine the determinants of relative prices, I calculate a relative ask (bid) between the two
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markets as the synthetic ask (bid) divided by the borrowing-adjusted cash ask (bid) minus one.
Then I regress the relative prices on the candidate variables described above using Fama-MacBeth
(1973) regressions. The cross-sectional slope coefficients are first estimated every day and then
averaged over time. To account for the serial correlation in the slope coefficients, Newey-West
(1987) standard errors with six lags are used to calculate the t-statistics. Table 8 reports the results
for the relative ask as the dependent variable with each category of explanatory variables are first
examined separately and then altogether. In Column (1), I examine the effect of hedging costs.
The coefficient of Spread is significantly positive with a t-statistic of 23.7, indicating that larger
underlying spread boosts the relative ask price. Stochastic volatility also has a positive impact
on the relative ask as the coefficient estimate has a t-statistic of 41.8. Because it is more costly
for options market makers to hedge when the underlying spread is large or when the volatility of
volatility is high, these results support the notion that hedging costs can make the synthetic stock
ask higher relative to the actual ask. Column (2) investigates the leverage effect coming from
options traders’ demand. Institutional ownership, as a measure of inverse financing constraint, is
negatively related to the relative ask with a t-statistic of -63.18, consistent with the prediction that
the demand for leverage can lead to a higher synthetic ask price for buyers. Column (3) examines
the impact of adverse selection. The absolute order imbalance in both the options and stock markets
have negative coefficient estimates statistically significant at the 1% level. While adverse selection
costs in the stock market are expected to increase the actual ask, hence reducing the relative ask,
the negative relation between information risk in the options market and relative ask is inconsistent
with the effect of adverse selection. Therefore, the overall effect of adverse selection is unclear in
this test. Finally, in Column (4), I regress relative ask on all the explanatory variables at the same
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time. The results on all the variables are qualitatively the same as in the first three columns.
(Table 8 about here)
Next, I turn to the relative bid in Table 9, expecting the estimated coefficients to have opposite
signs to those in Table 8. This is because the same factor driving synthetic ask higher should
lead to lower synthetic and relative bid. The results in all the columns support this prediction.
Specifically, both Spread and Vol ivol are negatively related to the relative bid, suggesting that
high hedging costs of options market makers reduce the synthetic bid relative to the actual bid.
Ownership has a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that synthetic bid is higher when
the representative investor is less financially constrained. This is consistent with sellers’ demand
for leverage drives the synthetic bid lower than the actual bid. Mirroring the results in Table 8, I
also find that information risk in both the stock market and options market increases the relative
bid. While the positive relation between adverse selection in stock trading and the relative bid
is consistent with classical microstructure theories, the same effect from options trading imposes
challenges to the theories.
In summary, the analysis in this section shows that wide synthetic bid-ask spread relative to
the actual spread is mainly driven by options market makers’ hedging costs and options traders’
demand for leverage. Meanwhile, the information based mechanism has inconsistent effects empirically.
(Table 9 about here)
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6. Conclusion
In this article, I analyze the price difference between synthetic stocks constructed using options
and actual stocks after adjusting for security borrowing costs explicitly. The results show that
contrary to the conventional wisdom that the synthetic price is lower than the cash price, in the
sample of all common stocks with options between 2007 and 2012, the synthetic mid quote price
is not systematically different from the mid quote in the cash market. However, the synthetic
bid-ask spread usually contains the cash spread, suggesting the synthetic prices are inferior to cash
prices for both buyers and sellers. This pattern exists for over 95% of stock-day observations.
The arbitrage opportunity with overpriced synthetic stocks is as common as that with underpriced
synthetic stocks, both at around 0.8% of the time. However, the arbitrage with overpriced synthetic
stocks is more persistent for the same stock over time, and has a greater average profit.
Having documented the puzzle that synthetic stock traders always face worse prices than cash
stock traders, the study investigates why this can be an equilibrium result. The regression analysis
shows that the wide synthetic spread results from options market makers’ hedging costs and options
traders’ demand for leverage. Specifically, the spread increases on both the ask and bid sides
when the underlying spread is large, when the volatility of implied volatility in the options market
are high, or when the institutional ownership of the underlying stock is low. Although adverse
selection costs are important in the market microstructure literature in determining the spread, I
fail to find consistent evidence supporting the same effect in synthetic pricing. Nonetheless, the
explanations from both supply and demand sides uncovered potentially lead to an equilibrium
result. It would therefore be interesting to develop derivative pricing models that take into account
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the hedging costs and demand for leverage at the same time. This article focuses on the comparison
and explanation of the price difference between synthetic and cash stocks. For future research, it
would be interesting to examine the asset pricing implications. There is a large literature on the
lead-lag relation between derivative and underlying markets motivated by informed traders’ choice
of the trading venue. Given the impact of non-information related market frictions documented in
this study, it is possible that the return predictability can root in dynamics of relative liquidity,
options market makers’ hedging costs, and investors’ leverage demand too. I leave these questions
to future studies.
Data Availability Statement
The data that support the findings of this study are available from OptionMetrics, Markit, Trade
Alert, NYSE, and CRSP. Restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under
license for this study. Data are available from the author with the permission of OptionMetrics,
Markit, Trade Alert, NYSE, and CRSP.
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This table describes the sample in the study from 2007 to 2012. To be included, a common stock
(CRSP code 10 and 11) must have options prices available in Option Metrics and short selling
data from Markit with its stock price above $5. Stock-day observations with non-dividend stock
distributions, loanable shares more than number of shares outstanding, negative stock borrowing
fees, crossed or locked close bid and ask prices in either the stock or options market are excluded.
Reported for each year as well as the full sample are the total number of stock-day observations,
number of unique stocks in the year, average daily stock and options trading volumes and options
open interest per stock. Stock trading volume is in number of shares. Options trading volume and
open interest are counted in option lots with one lot equivalent to one hundred shares of stocks.
Year N of ob N of stocks Stock volume Option volume Open interests
2007 346,723 2,351 2,150,539 3,883 99,157
2008 305,790 2,308 3,060,339 4,669 105,045
2009 278,344 2,160 3,115,314 4,676 91,966
2010 326,319 2,247 2,832,596 4,471 92,019
2011 338,198 2,341 2,726,529 5,091 98,037
2012 319,427 2,295 2,472,760 5,366 96,468
Total 1,914,801 3,330 2,707,798 4,685 97,189
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Table 2
Mid quote locations in the two markets
This table compares the synthetic mid quote price with the borrowing-cost adjusted mid quote price in the
stock market in the sample described in Table 1. The synthetic bid and ask prices are constructed using a
pair of closest-to-the-money call and options as follows:
bidi = (Bid Call−EEP Call)− (Ask Put−EEP Put)+PV (K)+PV (Div),
aski = (Ask Call−EEP Call)− (Bid Put−EEP Put)+PV (K)+PV (Div),
where PV (K) is the present value of the strike price, EEP is the early exercise premium calculated as the
difference between the actual midpoint of the option bid-ask prices and the Black-Scholes (1973) European
option price, and Div is the present value of the announced dividends before the options maturity. For each
underlying stock, only the closest-to-the-money option pair expiring in 10 to 40 days is chosen to calculate
the synthetic stock prices every day. The borrowing-cost adjusted bid and ask prices are:
bida = bid ∗ (1− lending f ee∗ t ′ ∗ exp(−r ∗ t)),
aska = ask ∗ (1−utilization∗ lending f ee∗ t ∗ exp(−r ∗ t)),
where bid and ask are the close bid and ask prices in CRSP, utilization is the percentage of shares on
loan relative to the total number of shares available for lending, lending f ee is the net stock borrowing cost
in percentage, t is the time to expiration of the synthetic stock, t ′ is t minus three days assuming short
sellers deliver stocks three days after the transaction, and r is the risk-free rate of return. The mid quote
prices are the average of bid and ask prices labeled as midi for the synthetic stock, mid for the actual stock
without security lending costs, and mida for the actual stock with security lending costs. Panel A reports
the descriptive statistics of the ratio and difference between the two mid quote prices of synthetic and actual
stocks. Panel B reports the percentage of observations in each category.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std Min Max
midi/mid 1,914,801 99.975 0.473 75.291 153.886
midi/mida 1,914,801 100.001 0.464 75.321 153.895
midi - mid 1,914,801 -0.664 14.455 -886.266 1763.82
midi - mida 1,914,801 -0.046 14.23 -874.539 1764.22
Panel B: Mid quote comparison
year N midi≥mid midi<mid midi≥mida midi<mida
2007 346,723 44.3 55.7 48.35 51.65
2008 305,790 40.45 59.55 44.09 55.91
2009 278,344 44.85 55.15 46.68 53.32
2010 326,319 46.41 53.59 48.99 51.01
2011 338,198 47 53 49.52 50.48
2012 319,427 45.16 54.84 48.86 51.14
Total 1,914,801 44.75 55.25 47.83 52.17
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Table 3
Comparing actual and synthetic bid prices
This table compares the synthetic bid price with the borrowing-cost adjusted bid price in the stock market
in the sample described in Table 1. The synthetic bid (bidi), borrowing-cost adjusted actual bid (bida) and
unadjusted actual bid (bid) are the same as defined in Table 2. Panel Panel A reports the descriptive statistics
of the ratio and difference between the two bid prices. Panel B reports the percentage of observations in
each category.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std Min Max
bidi/bid 1,914,801 98.946 1.32 38.793 153.142
bidi/bida 1,914,801 98.973 1.309 38.797 153.158
bidi - bid 1,914,801 -26.396 36.756 -3353.7 3765.88
bidi - bida 1,914,801 -25.717 36.531 -3344.07 3770
Panel B: Bid prices comparison
year N bidi≥bid bidi<bid bidi≥bida bidi<bida
2007 346,723 1.53 98.47 1.94 98.06
2008 305,790 1.07 98.93 1.39 98.61
2009 278,344 1.12 98.88 1.33 98.67
2010 326,319 1.66 98.34 2.12 97.88
2011 338,198 1.94 98.06 2.30 97.70
2012 319,427 2.70 97.30 3.42 96.58
Total 1,914,801 1.69 98.31 2.10 97.90
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Table 4
Comparing actual and synthetic ask prices
This table compares the synthetic ask price with the borrowing-cost adjusted ask price in the stock
market in the sample described in Table 1. The synthetic ask (aski), borrowing-cost adjusted actual
ask (aska) and unadjusted actual ask (ask) are the same as defined in Table 2. Panel A reports the
descriptive statistics of the ratio and difference between the two ask prices. Panel B reports the
percentage of observations in each category.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std Min Max
aski/ask 1,914,801 101.003 1.284 76.677 161.473
aski/aska 1,914,801 101.023 1.287 76.688 161.477
aski - ask 1,914,801 25.068 36.68 -1934.12 3492.82
aski - aska 1,914,801 25.53 36.654 -1934.03 3492.82
Panel B: Ask prices comparison
year N aski≥ask aski<ask aski≥aska aski<aska
2007 346,723 97.45 2.55 97.79 2.21
2008 305,790 97.39 2.61 97.95 2.05
2009 278,344 97.72 2.28 98.23 1.77
2010 326,319 97.13 2.87 97.63 2.37
2011 338,198 96.98 3.02 97.54 2.46
2012 319,427 95.96 4.04 96.94 3.06
Total 1,914,801 97.09 2.91 97.67 2.33
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Table 5
Locations of actual and synthetic quotes and arbitrage opportunities
This table reports the percentage of stock-day observations for six types of quote locations as
described in Figure 1 for individual years as well as the full sample. Synthetic ask (aski) and bid
(bidi) are calculated as in Tables 2. Actual ask and bid prices are adjusted for security lending costs
in Panel A and unadjusted in Panel B. Type A is when the synthetic ask is above the actual ask and
the synthetic bid is below the actual bid. Type B is when the synthetic ask is above the actual ask
and the synthetic bid is above the actual bid but below the actual ask. Type C is when the synthetic
ask is below the actual ask but above the actual bid and the synthetic bid is below the actual bid.
Type D is when the synthetic ask is below the actual ask and the synthetic bid is above the actual
bid. Type E is an arbitrage opportunity when both the synthetic ask and bid are above the actual
ask. Type F is an arbitrage opportunity when both the synthetic ask and bid are below the actual
bid.
Panel A: With lending fees
year Type A Type B Type C Type D Type E Type F
2007 96.16 1.30 1.59 0.30 0.34 0.31
2008 96.73 0.95 1.51 0.17 0.27 0.37
2009 97.00 0.77 1.17 0.10 0.46 0.51
2010 95.52 1.17 1.38 0.01 0.94 0.98
2011 95.25 1.03 1.23 0.02 1.26 1.22
2012 93.51 1.42 1.58 0.01 2.00 1.48
Total 95.66 1.12 1.41 0.10 0.89 0.82
Panel B: Without lending fees
year Type A Type B Type C Type D Type E Type F
2007 96.22 0.99 1.75 0.29 0.24 0.51
2008 96.48 0.71 1.71 0.16 0.20 0.74
2009 96.69 0.66 1.31 0.09 0.37 0.88
2010 95.48 0.85 1.47 0.01 0.80 1.39
2011 95.05 0.82 1.26 0.01 1.11 1.76
2012 93.26 0.98 1.67 0.00 1.72 2.36
Total 95.50 0.84 1.53 0.09 0.75 1.28
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Table 6
Transition matrix for different quote types
This table reports the estimated Markov chain transition matrix for the six types of synthetic and
actual quote locations as described in Figure 1 in the full sample of 2007 to 2012. Synthetic ask
(aski) and bid (bidi) are calculated as in Tables 2. Actual ask and bid prices are adjusted for security
lending costs. Type A is when the synthetic ask is above the actual ask and the synthetic bid is
below the actual bid. Type B is when the synthetic ask is above the actual ask and the synthetic
bid is above the actual bid but below the actual ask. Type C is when the synthetic ask is below the
actual ask but above the actual bid and the synthetic bid is below the actual bid. Type D is when
the synthetic ask is below the actual ask and the synthetic bid is above the actual bid. Type E is an
arbitrage opportunity when both the synthetic ask and bid are above the actual ask. Type F is an
arbitrage opportunity when both the synthetic ask and bid are below the actual bid. The transition
probabilities are estimated from day t−1 to t.
t-1/t Type A Type B Type C Type D Type E Type F
Type A 97.22 0.80 1.04 0.08 0.39 0.47
Type B 68.52 11.56 7.68 0.59 6.85 4.79
Type C 70.49 6.14 12.23 0.50 3.56 7.08
Type D 79.18 5.33 8.51 3.79 1.03 2.15
Type E 41.11 8.93 5.62 0.15 37.98 6.21




This table reports the number of arbitrage opportunities and average arbitrage profit per share for
Type E (when the synthetic bid is above the actual ask) in Panel A and for Type F (when the
synthetic ask is below the actual bid) in Panel B for individual years as well as the full sample. The
synthetic bid (bidi) and ask (aski) prices and the borrowing-cost adjusted bid (bida) and ask (aska)
prices for arbitragers are calculated as in Tables 2. Columns (3) and (4) considers the commission
the arbitrager pays to trade 10 lots of stocks and synthetic stocks. Columns (5) and (6) considers
the commission the arbitrager pays to trade 1 lot only.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Type E arbitrage
Fee for 10 lots Fee for 1 lot
year N mean N mean N mean
2007 1,175 0.800 706 1.279 390 2.017
2008 840 0.267 452 0.440 160 0.859
2009 1,294 0.355 636 0.665 291 1.123
2010 3,062 0.311 1,188 0.740 479 1.483
2011 4,252 0.094 1,577 0.186 317 0.384
2012 6,384 0.330 2,898 0.667 1,147 1.332
Total 17,007 0.299 7,457 0.621 2,784 1.297
Panel B: Type F arbitrage
Fee for 10 lots Fee for 1 lot
year N mean N mean N mean
2007 1,070 0.123 557 0.180 113 0.331
2008 1,126 0.087 459 0.150 72 0.330
2009 1,408 0.043 298 0.112 32 0.318
2010 3,208 0.030 511 0.081 42 0.224
2011 4,138 0.040 926 0.089 74 0.326
2012 4,727 0.045 818 0.157 100 0.733
Total 15,677 0.049 3,569 0.128 433 0.411
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Table 8
Determinants of the relative ask price
This table examines determinants of the relative ask price in the cross-section. The synthetic ask (aski)
and borrowing-cost adjusted ask (aska) are the same as in Table 2. Reported are the coefficient estimates
from daily Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of the relative ask defined as PD ask = aski/aska− 1 with
t-statistics calculated using Newey-West (1980) standard errors. Spread is the percentage bid-ask spread of
the underlying stock. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the past 21 trading days.
Vol ivol is the standard deviation of the average implied volatility of the at-the-money call and put option
pair with 30 days to maturity using the past 21 trading days. Ownership is the institutional holding at the
end of the previous quarter. OOI and SOI are the option delta imbalance and net stock order imbalance
calculated as in Hu (2014). All variables are calculated on the same day except Ownership. All coefficients
are multiplied by 100. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.251∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗













Adj. Rsq 0.188 0.01 0.015 0.22
N per day 1305 1312 1312 1305
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Table 9
Determinants of the relative bid price
This table examines determinants of the relative bid in the cross-section. The synthetic bid (bidi) and
borrowing-cost adjusted bid (bida) are the same as in Table 2. Reported are the coefficient estimates
from daily Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of the relative bid defined as PD bid = bidi/bida− 1 with
t-statistics calculated using Newey-West (1980) standard errors. Spread is the percentage bid-ask spread of
the underlying stock. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the past 21 trading days.
Vol ivol is the standard deviation of the average implied volatility of the at-the-money call and put option
pair with 30 days to maturity using the past 21 trading days. Ownership is the institutional holding at the
end of the previous quarter. OOI and SOI are the option delta imbalance and net stock order imbalance
calculated as in Hu (2014). All variables are calculated on the same day except Ownership. All coefficients
are multiplied by 100. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.261∗∗∗ -1.192∗∗∗ -1.139∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗













Adj. Rsq 0.183 0.009 0.017 0.216
N per day 1305 1312 1312 1305
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Figure 1
Types of actual and synthetic quote locations
This figure shows the six types of actual and synthetic quote locations. The synthetic bid and ask prices are
constructed using a pair of closest-to-the-money call and options as follows:
bidi = (Bid Call−EEP Call)− (Ask Put−EEP Put)+PV (K)+PV (Div),
aski = (Ask Call−EEP Call)− (Bid Put−EEP Put)+PV (K)+PV (Div),
where PV (K) is the present value of the strike price, EEP is the early exercise premium calculated as the
difference between the actual midpoint of the option bid-ask prices and the Black-Scholes (1973) European
option price, and Div is the present value of the announced dividends before the options maturity. For each
underlying stock, only the closest-to-the-money option pair expiring in 10 to 40 days is chosen to calculate
the synthetic stock prices every day. The borrowing-cost adjusted bid and ask prices are:
bida = bid ∗ (1− lending f ee∗ t ′ ∗ exp(−r ∗ t)),
aska = ask ∗ (1−utilization∗ lending f ee∗ t ∗ exp(−r ∗ t)),
where bid and ask are the close bid and ask prices in CRSP, utilization is the percentage of shares on loan
relative to the total number of shares available for lending, lending f ee is the net stock borrowing cost in
percentage, t is the time to expiration of the synthetic stock, t ′ is t minus three days assuming short sellers
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